88 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
88 lines
5.5 KiB
Python
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stringo = """
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In his recent Sweet Dreams,25 Dennett correctly identifies the funda-
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mental quandary confronting those who would uphold the uncondi-
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tional transparency of the phenomenal realm: if the constitutive features
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of ‘appearing qua appearing’ are non-relational and non-functional,
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and hence inherently resistant to conceptual articulation, then even the
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first-person phenomenological subject of experience lacks the resources
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to apprehend them; he or she will always be separated from his or her
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own immediate experience of the phenomenon per se by some medi-
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ating instance, for every description of a phenomenal representatum
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entails transforming the latter into the representandum of another phe-
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nomenal representatum, and so on. In this regard, Dennett’s penetrating
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critique of some of the more extravagant superstitions entailed by
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philosophers’ ‘qualiaphilia’ chimes with Derrida’s critique of Husserl:
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the notion of an absolutely transparent but non-relational phenomenal
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appearance is incoherent much for the same reason as the idea of
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consciousness as locus of absolute self-presence is incoherent.26 If one
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acknowledges that the conceit of a phenomenal appearing devoid of
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all relational and functional properties is nonsensical, then one must
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concede that phenomenological experience itself shows that we our-
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selves do not enjoy privileged access to all the properties intrinsic to
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appearance qua appearance. Accordingly, there is no reason to suppose
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that appearing is absolutely transparent to us, and therefore no reason
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not to accept the idea (long advocated by Dennett) that the phenome-
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non of consciousness itself invites a distinction between those features
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of appearance that are apprehended by us, and those that elude us.
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For if appearance is sufficient unto itself, the price of upholding the
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claim that our experience of appearance is entirely adequate to that
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appearance would seem to be a position perilously close to absolute
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solipsism (this is precisely the option embraced by some of Heidegger’s
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phenomenological heirs, suh as Michel Henry).27 Of course, having
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conceded that the notion of a non-manifest appearance is not entirely
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oxymoronic, the question remains whether to raise the stakes by insist-
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ing that this latent or non-manifest dimension of phenomenality
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transcends objective description altogether, as did the early Heidegger,
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who chose to see in it the unobjectifiable being of the phenomenon,
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which science is constitutively incapable of grasping; or whether to
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grant that this non-manifest dimension is perfectly amenable to
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description from the third-person point of view characteristic of the
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sciences, and hence something which falls under the remit of the sci-
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entific study of the phenomenon of consciousness. Obviously, such a
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choice depends on a prior decision about the scope and limits of
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scientific investigation, and about whether or not it is right to remove
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certain phenomena, specifically those associated with human con-
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sciousness, from the ambit of that investigation as a matter of principle.
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More abstractly, this can be characterized as a speculative decision
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about whether to characterize the latency of phenomena in terms of
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unobjectifiable transcendence, as Heidegger does with his invocation
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of ‘being’, or in terms of immanent objectivity, as Churchland and
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Metzinger do when invoking the un-conscious, sub-symbolic processes
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through which phenomenal consciousness is produced. Our contention
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here is that the latter option is clearly preferable, since it begs fewer
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questions; yet it remains compromised by an alliance with pragmatism
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which vitiates the commitment to scientific realism which should be
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among its enabling conditions. Naturalism may not be the best guar-
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antor of realism, and in subsequent chapters we will try to define the
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rudiments of a speculative realism and elaborate on some of the con-
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ceptual ramifications entailed by a metaphysical radicalization of
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eliminativism. Our provisional conclusion at this stage however, is that
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far from being some incontrovertible datum blocking the integration of
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the first-person point of view into the third-person scientific viewpoint,
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the appearing of appearance can and should be understood as a phe-
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nomenon generated by sub-personal but perfectly objectifiable neuro-
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biological processes. Indeed, as Metzinger persuasively argues, there are
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solid grounds for maintaining that the phenomenological subject of
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appearance is itself a phenomenal appearance generated by in-apparent
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neurobiological processes. Thus, for Metzinger, concomitant with this
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subversion of our phenomenological self-conception is a subversion of
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our understanding of ourselves as selves.28 Yet faced with this unantici-
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pated twist in the trajectory of Enlightenment, which seems to issue in
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a conception of consciousness utterly at odds with the image of the
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latter promoted by those philosophers who exalted consciousness
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above all other phenomena, philosophers committed to the canon of
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rationality defined by Kant and Hegel have vigorously denounced
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what they see as the barbaric consequences of untrammelled scientific
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rationalism. Ironically enough, it is precisely those philosophers who
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see the fundamental task of philosophy as critique who have proved to be
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among the staunchest defenders of the legitimacy of the manifest image.
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In the next chapter, we will examine one of the most sophisticated
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defences of the latter in the shape of the critique of Enlightenment
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rationality proposed by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer.
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"""
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print(
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stringo[1:].replace('\n', ' ')
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) |