1.7 закинуто + машинопереводус

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-The trouble with Churchland’s naturalism is not so much that it is
-metaphysical, but that it is an impoverished metaphysics, inadequate
-to the task of grounding the relation between representation and reality.
-Moreover, Churchland’s difficulties in this regard are symptomatic of a
-wider problem concerning the way in which philosophical naturalism
-frames its own relation to science. While vague talk of rendering phi-
-losophy consistent with ‘the findings of our best sciences’ remains
-entirely commendable, it tends to distract attention away from the
-amount of philosophical work required in order to render these find-
-ings metaphysically coherent. The goal is surely to devise a metaphysics
-worthy of the sciences, and here neither empiricism nor pragmatism are
-likely to prove adequate to the task. Science need no more defer to
-empiricism’s enthronement of ‘experience’ than to naturalism’s hypo-
-statization of ‘nature’. Both remain entirely extraneous to science’s
-subtractive modus operandi. From the perspective of the latter, both the
-invocation of ‘experience’ qua realm of ‘originary intuitions’ and the
-appeal to ‘nature’ qua domain of autonomous functions are irrelevant.
-We shall try to explain in subsequent chapters how science subtracts
-nature from experience, the better to uncover the objective void of
-being. But if, as we are contending here, the principal task of contem-
-porary philosophy is to draw out the ultimate speculative implications
-of the logic of Enlightenment, then the former cannot allow itself to be
-seduced into contriving ever more sophistical proofs for the transcen-
-dental inviolability of the manifest image. Nor should it resign itself to
-espousing naturalism and taking up residence in the scientific image
-in the hope of winning promotion to the status of cognitive science.
-Above all, it should not waste time trying to effect some sort of synthe-
-sis or reconciliation between the manifest and scientific images. The
-philosophical consummation of Enlightenment consists in expediting
-science’s demolition of the manifest image by kicking away whatever
-pseudo-transcendental props are being used to shore it up or otherwise
-inhibit the corrosive potency of science’s metaphysical subtractions. In
-this regard, it is precisely Churchland’s attempt to preserve a normative
-role for the ‘superempirical virtues’ that vitiates his version of EM.
+In his recent Sweet Dreams,25 Dennett correctly identifies the funda-
+mental quandary confronting those who would uphold the uncondi-
+tional transparency of the phenomenal realm: if the constitutive features
+of ‘appearing qua appearing’ are non-relational and non-functional,
+and hence inherently resistant to conceptual articulation, then even the
+first-person phenomenological subject of experience lacks the resources
+to apprehend them; he or she will always be separated from his or her
+own immediate experience of the phenomenon per se by some medi-
+ating instance, for every description of a phenomenal representatum
+entails transforming the latter into the representandum of another phe-
+nomenal representatum, and so on. In this regard, Dennett’s penetrating
+critique of some of the more extravagant superstitions entailed by
+philosophers’ ‘qualiaphilia’ chimes with Derrida’s critique of Husserl:
+the notion of an absolutely transparent but non-relational phenomenal
+appearance is incoherent much for the same reason as the idea of
+consciousness as locus of absolute self-presence is incoherent.26 If one
+acknowledges that the conceit of a phenomenal appearing devoid of
+all relational and functional properties is nonsensical, then one must
+concede that phenomenological experience itself shows that we our-
+selves do not enjoy privileged access to all the properties intrinsic to
+appearance qua appearance. Accordingly, there is no reason to suppose
+that appearing is absolutely transparent to us, and therefore no reason
+not to accept the idea (long advocated by Dennett) that the phenome-
+non of consciousness itself invites a distinction between those features
+of appearance that are apprehended by us, and those that elude us.
+For if appearance is sufficient unto itself, the price of upholding the
+claim that our experience of appearance is entirely adequate to that
+appearance would seem to be a position perilously close to absolute
+solipsism (this is precisely the option embraced by some of Heidegger’s
+phenomenological heirs, suh as Michel Henry).27 Of course, having
+conceded that the notion of a non-manifest appearance is not entirely
+oxymoronic, the question remains whether to raise the stakes by insist-
+ing that this latent or non-manifest dimension of phenomenality
+transcends objective description altogether, as did the early Heidegger,
+who chose to see in it the unobjectifiable being of the phenomenon,
+which science is constitutively incapable of grasping; or whether to
+grant that this non-manifest dimension is perfectly amenable to
+description from the third-person point of view characteristic of the
+sciences, and hence something which falls under the remit of the sci-
+entific study of the phenomenon of consciousness. Obviously, such a
+choice depends on a prior decision about the scope and limits of
+scientific investigation, and about whether or not it is right to remove
+certain phenomena, specifically those associated with human con-
+sciousness, from the ambit of that investigation as a matter of principle.
+More abstractly, this can be characterized as a speculative decision
+about whether to characterize the latency of phenomena in terms of
+unobjectifiable transcendence, as Heidegger does with his invocation
+of ‘being’, or in terms of immanent objectivity, as Churchland and
+Metzinger do when invoking the un-conscious, sub-symbolic processes
+through which phenomenal consciousness is produced. Our contention
+here is that the latter option is clearly preferable, since it begs fewer
+questions; yet it remains compromised by an alliance with pragmatism
+which vitiates the commitment to scientific realism which should be
+among its enabling conditions. Naturalism may not be the best guar-
+antor of realism, and in subsequent chapters we will try to define the
+rudiments of a speculative realism and elaborate on some of the con-
+ceptual ramifications entailed by a metaphysical radicalization of
+eliminativism. Our provisional conclusion at this stage however, is that
+far from being some incontrovertible datum blocking the integration of
+the first-person point of view into the third-person scientific viewpoint,
+the appearing of appearance can and should be understood as a phe-
+nomenon generated by sub-personal but perfectly objectifiable neuro-
+biological processes. Indeed, as Metzinger persuasively argues, there are
+solid grounds for maintaining that the phenomenological subject of
+appearance is itself a phenomenal appearance generated by in-apparent
+neurobiological processes. Thus, for Metzinger, concomitant with this
+subversion of our phenomenological self-conception is a subversion of
+our understanding of ourselves as selves.28 Yet faced with this unantici-
+pated twist in the trajectory of Enlightenment, which seems to issue in
+a conception of consciousness utterly at odds with the image of the
+latter promoted by those philosophers who exalted consciousness
+above all other phenomena, philosophers committed to the canon of
+rationality defined by Kant and Hegel have vigorously denounced
+what they see as the barbaric consequences of untrammelled scientific
+rationalism. Ironically enough, it is precisely those philosophers who
+see the fundamental task of philosophy as critique who have proved to be
+among the staunchest defenders of the legitimacy of the manifest image.
+In the next chapter, we will examine one of the most sophisticated
+defences of the latter in the shape of the critique of Enlightenment
+rationality proposed by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer.
 """
 
 print(
-    stringo.replace('\n', ' ')
+    stringo[1:].replace('\n', ' ')
 )