готовим структуру

book/src/preface.md

@@ -35,32 +35,7 @@ First and foremost, it does not treat nihilism as a disease, requiring diagnosis
 
 ---
 
-Two basic contentions underlie this book. First, that the disenchant-
-ment of the world understood as a consequence of the process whereby
-the Enlightenment shattered the ‘great chain of being’ and defaced the
-‘book of the world’ is a necessary consequence of the coruscating potency
-of reason, and hence an invigorating vector of intellectual discovery,
-rather than a calamitous diminishment. Jonathan Israel’s work provided
-a direct source of inspiration for this idea and his magisterial recounting
-of philosophy’s crucial role in what was arguably the most far-reaching
-(and still ongoing) intellectual revolution of the past two thousand
-years furnishes a salutary and much-needed corrective to the tide of
-anti-Enlightenment revisionism with which so much twentieth-century
-philosophy has been complicit.3 The disenchantment of the world
-deserves to be celebrated as an achievement of intellectual maturity, not
-bewailed as a debilitating impoverishment. The second fundamental
-contention of this book is that nihilism is not, as Jacobi and so many
-other philosophers since have insisted, a pathological exacerbation of
-subjectivism, which annuls the world and reduces reality to a correlate
-of the absolute ego, but on the contrary, the unavoidable corollary of
-the realist conviction that there is a mind-independent reality, which,
-despite the presumptions of human narcissism, is indifferent to our exis-
-tence and oblivious to the ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ which we would drape
-over it in order to make it more hospitable. Nature is not our or anyone’s
-‘home’, nor a particularly beneficent progenitor. Philosophers would do
-well to desist from issuing any further injunctions about the need to
-re-establish the meaningfulness of existence, the purposefulness of life,
-or mend the shattered concord between man and nature. Philosophy
+Two basic contentions underlie this book. First, that the disenchantment of the world understood as a consequence of the process whereby the Enlightenment shattered the ‘great chain of being’ and defaced the ‘book of the world’ is a necessary consequence of the coruscating potency of reason, and hence an invigorating vector of intellectual discovery, rather than a calamitous diminishment. Jonathan Israel’s work provided a direct source of inspiration for this idea and his magisterial recounting of philosophy’s crucial role in what was arguably the most far-reaching (and still ongoing) intellectual revolution of the past two thousand years furnishes a salutary and much-needed corrective to the tide of anti-Enlightenment revisionism with which so much twentieth-century philosophy has been complicit.3 The disenchantment of the world deserves to be celebrated as an achievement of intellectual maturity, not bewailed as a debilitating impoverishment. The second fundamental contention of this book is that nihilism is not, as Jacobi and so many other philosophers since have insisted, a pathological exacerbation of subjectivism, which annuls the world and reduces reality to a correlate of the absolute ego, but on the contrary, the unavoidable corollary of the realist conviction that there is a mind-independent reality, which, despite the presumptions of human narcissism, is indifferent to our existence and oblivious to the ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ which we would drape over it in order to make it more hospitable. Nature is not our or anyone’s ‘home’, nor a particularly beneficent progenitor. Philosophers would do well to desist from issuing any further injunctions about the need to re-establish the meaningfulness of existence, the purposefulness of life, or mend the shattered concord between man and nature. Philosophy
 should be more than a sop to the pathetic twinge of human self-esteem.
 Nihilism is not an existential quandary but a speculative opportunity.
 Thinking has interests that do not coincide with those of living; indeed,
@@ -69,13 +44,15 @@ bility that this book attempts to investigate. Its deficiencies are patent,
 and unfortunately the shortfall between ambition and ability means
 that it is neither as thorough nor as comprehensive as would be neces-
 sary to make its case convincingly. Much more needs to be demonstrated
-in order to field an argument robust enough to withstand the sceptical
-Preface
-xi
-rejoinders which the book’s principal contentions are sure to provoke.
-Nevertheless, the themes broached here, however unsatisfactorily, should
-be considered as preliminary forays in an investigation which I hope to
+in order to field an argument robust enough to withstand the sceptical rejoinders which the book’s principal contentions are sure to provoke. Nevertheless, the themes broached here, however unsatisfactorily, should be considered as preliminary forays in an investigation which I hope to
 develop more fully in subsequent work.
+
+
+----
+
+> переведи это
+
+
 The book is divided into three parts. Chapter 1 introduces the theme
 which governs the first part of the book, ‘Destroying the Manifest Image’,
 by considering Wilfrid Sellars’s distinction between the ‘manifest’ and
@@ -110,21 +87,17 @@ the preceding chapters, before proposing a speculative re-inscription of
 Freud’s theory of the death-drive, wherein the sublimation of the latter
 is seen as the key to grasping the intimate link between the will to
 know and the will to nothingness.
-Thanks to Dan Bunyard, Michael Carr, Mark Fisher, Graham Harman,
-Robin Mackay, Dustin McWherter, Nina Power, Dan Smith, Alberto
-Toscano, and my colleagues at the Centre for Research in Modern
-xii
-Preface
-European Philosophy: Eric Alliez, Peter Hallward, Christian Kerslake,
-Stewart Martin, Peter Osborne, Stella Sandford.
-Special thanks to Damian Veal for help with the final preparation of
-the manuscript, and above all to Michelle Speidel.
-Acknowledgements:
-An early version of Chapter 2 appeared in The Origins and Ends of the
-Mind ed. R. Brassier and C. Kerslake, Leuven University Press, 2007; an
-abbreviated version of Chapter 3 appeared in Collapse, Vol. II, February
-2007; an edited version of Chapter 4 provided the basis for the article
-‘Presentation as Anti-Phenomenon in Alain Badiou’s Being and Event’
-in Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 39, No. 1; finally, material from
-sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 7 originally appeared in an article entitled
-‘Solar Catastrophe’ in Philosophy Today, Vol. 47, Winter 2003
+
+Thanks to Dan Bunyard, Michael Carr, Mark Fisher, Graham Harman, Robin Mackay, Dustin McWherter, Nina Power, Dan Smith, Alberto Toscano, and my colleagues at the Centre for Research in Modern 
+European Philosophy: Eric Alliez, Peter Hallward, Christian Kerslake, Stewart Martin, Peter Osborne, Stella Sandford.
+
+Special thanks to Damian Veal for help with the final preparation of the manuscript, and above all to Michelle Speidel.
+
+----
+
+
+#### Acknowledgements // Благодарности
+
+> переведи это
+
+An early version of Chapter 2 appeared in The Origins and Ends of the Mind ed. R. Brassier and C. Kerslake, Leuven University Press, 2007; an abbreviated version of Chapter 3 appeared in Collapse, Vol. II, February 2007; an edited version of Chapter 4 provided the basis for the article ‘Presentation as Anti-Phenomenon in Alain Badiou’s Being and Event’ in Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 39, No. 1; finally, material from sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 7 originally appeared in an article entitled ‘Solar Catastrophe’ in Philosophy Today, Vol. 47, Winter 2003