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@ -35,32 +35,7 @@ First and foremost, it does not treat nihilism as a disease, requiring diagnosis
---
Two basic contentions underlie this book. First, that the disenchant-
ment of the world understood as a consequence of the process whereby
the Enlightenment shattered the great chain of being and defaced the
book of the world is a necessary consequence of the coruscating potency
of reason, and hence an invigorating vector of intellectual discovery,
rather than a calamitous diminishment. Jonathan Israels work provided
a direct source of inspiration for this idea and his magisterial recounting
of philosophys crucial role in what was arguably the most far-reaching
(and still ongoing) intellectual revolution of the past two thousand
years furnishes a salutary and much-needed corrective to the tide of
anti-Enlightenment revisionism with which so much twentieth-century
philosophy has been complicit.3 The disenchantment of the world
deserves to be celebrated as an achievement of intellectual maturity, not
bewailed as a debilitating impoverishment. The second fundamental
contention of this book is that nihilism is not, as Jacobi and so many
other philosophers since have insisted, a pathological exacerbation of
subjectivism, which annuls the world and reduces reality to a correlate
of the absolute ego, but on the contrary, the unavoidable corollary of
the realist conviction that there is a mind-independent reality, which,
despite the presumptions of human narcissism, is indifferent to our exis-
tence and oblivious to the values and meanings which we would drape
over it in order to make it more hospitable. Nature is not our or anyones
home, nor a particularly beneficent progenitor. Philosophers would do
well to desist from issuing any further injunctions about the need to
re-establish the meaningfulness of existence, the purposefulness of life,
or mend the shattered concord between man and nature. Philosophy
Two basic contentions underlie this book. First, that the disenchantment of the world understood as a consequence of the process whereby the Enlightenment shattered the great chain of being and defaced the book of the world is a necessary consequence of the coruscating potency of reason, and hence an invigorating vector of intellectual discovery, rather than a calamitous diminishment. Jonathan Israels work provided a direct source of inspiration for this idea and his magisterial recounting of philosophys crucial role in what was arguably the most far-reaching (and still ongoing) intellectual revolution of the past two thousand years furnishes a salutary and much-needed corrective to the tide of anti-Enlightenment revisionism with which so much twentieth-century philosophy has been complicit.3 The disenchantment of the world deserves to be celebrated as an achievement of intellectual maturity, not bewailed as a debilitating impoverishment. The second fundamental contention of this book is that nihilism is not, as Jacobi and so many other philosophers since have insisted, a pathological exacerbation of subjectivism, which annuls the world and reduces reality to a correlate of the absolute ego, but on the contrary, the unavoidable corollary of the realist conviction that there is a mind-independent reality, which, despite the presumptions of human narcissism, is indifferent to our existence and oblivious to the values and meanings which we would drape over it in order to make it more hospitable. Nature is not our or anyones home, nor a particularly beneficent progenitor. Philosophers would do well to desist from issuing any further injunctions about the need to re-establish the meaningfulness of existence, the purposefulness of life, or mend the shattered concord between man and nature. Philosophy
should be more than a sop to the pathetic twinge of human self-esteem.
Nihilism is not an existential quandary but a speculative opportunity.
Thinking has interests that do not coincide with those of living; indeed,
@ -69,13 +44,15 @@ bility that this book attempts to investigate. Its deficiencies are patent,
and unfortunately the shortfall between ambition and ability means
that it is neither as thorough nor as comprehensive as would be neces-
sary to make its case convincingly. Much more needs to be demonstrated
in order to field an argument robust enough to withstand the sceptical
Preface
xi
rejoinders which the books principal contentions are sure to provoke.
Nevertheless, the themes broached here, however unsatisfactorily, should
be considered as preliminary forays in an investigation which I hope to
in order to field an argument robust enough to withstand the sceptical rejoinders which the books principal contentions are sure to provoke. Nevertheless, the themes broached here, however unsatisfactorily, should be considered as preliminary forays in an investigation which I hope to
develop more fully in subsequent work.
----
> переведи это
The book is divided into three parts. Chapter 1 introduces the theme
which governs the first part of the book, Destroying the Manifest Image,
by considering Wilfrid Sellarss distinction between the manifest and
@ -110,21 +87,17 @@ the preceding chapters, before proposing a speculative re-inscription of
Freuds theory of the death-drive, wherein the sublimation of the latter
is seen as the key to grasping the intimate link between the will to
know and the will to nothingness.
Thanks to Dan Bunyard, Michael Carr, Mark Fisher, Graham Harman,
Robin Mackay, Dustin McWherter, Nina Power, Dan Smith, Alberto
Toscano, and my colleagues at the Centre for Research in Modern
xii
Preface
European Philosophy: Eric Alliez, Peter Hallward, Christian Kerslake,
Stewart Martin, Peter Osborne, Stella Sandford.
Special thanks to Damian Veal for help with the final preparation of
the manuscript, and above all to Michelle Speidel.
Acknowledgements:
An early version of Chapter 2 appeared in The Origins and Ends of the
Mind ed. R. Brassier and C. Kerslake, Leuven University Press, 2007; an
abbreviated version of Chapter 3 appeared in Collapse, Vol. II, February
2007; an edited version of Chapter 4 provided the basis for the article
Presentation as Anti-Phenomenon in Alain Badious Being and Event
in Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 39, No. 1; finally, material from
sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 7 originally appeared in an article entitled
Solar Catastrophe in Philosophy Today, Vol. 47, Winter 2003
Thanks to Dan Bunyard, Michael Carr, Mark Fisher, Graham Harman, Robin Mackay, Dustin McWherter, Nina Power, Dan Smith, Alberto Toscano, and my colleagues at the Centre for Research in Modern
European Philosophy: Eric Alliez, Peter Hallward, Christian Kerslake, Stewart Martin, Peter Osborne, Stella Sandford.
Special thanks to Damian Veal for help with the final preparation of the manuscript, and above all to Michelle Speidel.
----
#### Acknowledgements // Благодарности
> переведи это
An early version of Chapter 2 appeared in The Origins and Ends of the Mind ed. R. Brassier and C. Kerslake, Leuven University Press, 2007; an abbreviated version of Chapter 3 appeared in Collapse, Vol. II, February 2007; an edited version of Chapter 4 provided the basis for the article Presentation as Anti-Phenomenon in Alain Badious Being and Event in Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 39, No. 1; finally, material from sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 7 originally appeared in an article entitled Solar Catastrophe in Philosophy Today, Vol. 47, Winter 2003